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I. INTRODUCTION 
The considerable attention that the California Institute for Regenera-
tive Medicine (CIRM) and its Independent Citizens’ Oversight Committee 
(ICOC) have already devoted to framing their intellectual property (IP) 
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policies1 is a sure sign of the growing salience of IP in biomedical re-
search. In its Intellectual Property Policy for Non-Profit Organizations 
(IPPNPO), CIRM has endorsed a “core principle” to “encourage broad 
dissemination of CIRM-funded intellectual property of all types beyond 
practices commonly used in 2005 to promote scientific progress.”2 At the 
same time, CIRM has acknowledged competing interests that might limit 
such sharing, such as bringing scientific advances to the public through 
commercialization and providing a financial benefit to the State of Cali-
fornia through revenue sharing.3 Indeed, the text of Proposition 71, the 
initiative that created CIRM, explicitly sets forth these conflicting inter-
ests.4  
When it comes to balancing interests, the devil is in the details. The 
IPPNPO is richly detailed with respect to patenting, licensing, and the ex-
change of research materials. For these matters, the policy generally fol-
lows evolving standards of “best practices” for federally-funded research, 
as articulated in reports from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).5 For 
data sharing, however, while it states CIRM’s general expectations, the 
IPPNPO barely touches upon the details.6 
In recent years, data sharing has been a recurring focus of struggle 
within the biomedical research community as improvements in informa-
                                                                                                                         
 1.  See CIRM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
(2006), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/policies/pdf/ippnpo.pdf [hereinafter IPP-
NPO]; see also CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, POLICY FRAMEWORK 
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DERIVED FROM STEM CELL RESEARCH IN CALIFORNIA: 
INTERIM REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE FOR REGENERATIVE MEDICINE (2005), available at 
http://www.ccst.us/ccst/pubs/ip/ip%20interim.pdf. 
 2.  IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 25. 
 3.  Id. at 4-5.  
 4.  California Secretary of State, Text of Proposed Laws – Proposition 71, in CALI-
FORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 147 (2004), available at http://www.-
cirm.ca.gov/prop71/pdf/prop71.pdf [hereinafter Proposition 71].  
 5.  See, e.g., Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Grants and Contracts 
on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090 
(Dec. 23, 1999), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf (cited with ap-
proval in IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 12). 
 6.  The IPPNPO embraces the lofty aspirations for data sharing set forth in a series 
of recent reports from the National Research Council. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006), available at 
http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/11487.html#toc; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING 
PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN 
THE LIFE SCIENCES (2003), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/10613.html#toc 
(cited in IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 26-27) [hereinafter SHARING DATA & MATERIALS]. 
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tion technology and digital networks have expanded the ways in which 
data can be produced, disseminated, and used.7 Electronic archives aggre-
gate data from multiple sources, making it simpler and easier to share 
data.8 Such sharing and aggregation facilitate observations that would oth-
erwise be impossible, but data disclosure poses a dilemma for scientists. 
Data have long been scientists’ stock in trade, lending credibility to their 
claims while highlighting new questions that merit future research fund-
ing. Some disclosure is necessary in order to claim these benefits, but data 
disclosure may also benefit one’s research competitors. Scientists who 
share their data promptly and freely may find themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to free riders in the race to make future observations 
and thereby earn further recognition and funding. The possibility of com-
mercial gain further raises the competitive stakes. As information technol-
ogy has advanced, and as commercial interests in biomedical research 
have grown, this dilemma has become more pronounced.  
The role of statutory IP law in data sharing has been limited. Data per 
se are generally considered ineligible for either copyright or patent protec-
tion.9 As a consequence, the Bayh-Dole Act,10 which gives recipients of 
federal funding broad discretion to seek patent rights in the results of their 
federally-sponsored research, does not directly address the dissemination 
of unpatentable data.11 Meanwhile, the scientific community has sought to 
clarify its data sharing norms and to determine how to implement them.12  
                                                                                                                         
 7.  See, e.g., SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6. See generally NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 
(1997), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/5504.html#toc. 
 8. Of course, integration of data from sources that use different formats can be a 
problem. But software tools, such as BioPerl in the case of the genomic data produced by 
the Human Genome Project, can help to address the problem. See Colin Crossman & Arti 
Rai, A Brief History of BioPerl (working paper, on file with authors). 
 9.  For a review of the limits on copyright protection of data with citations to the 
relevant cases and literature, see J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Recon-
structed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual 
Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 336-41 (2003). For a review of 
the limits on patent protection of data, see U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim 
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 
1300 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2005), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm. 
 10.  Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)). 
 11.  Although sui generis database protection has been enacted in Europe, Council 
Directive 96/9 of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 
20, and proposed in the U.S., it has not yet been passed into law in the U.S. For a review 
of U.S. database protection proposals from the perspective of the scientific community, 
see J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent De-
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One important focus of debate has been the extent of data disclosure 
that should accompany scientific publication.13 Although disclosure of re-
search results is the essence of publication, scientific print journals typi-
cally reveal data only in summary form. This format provides authors sub-
stantial control over access to the underlying raw data. In an earlier era, 
such summary disclosures may have been necessary as a practical matter, 
given scarcities of space in print media. Now, however, with the growth of 
computer networks and information technology, a researcher can easily 
make vast data sets available over the internet at minimal cost. Yet, a re-
cent survey found that less than half of the most frequently cited journals 
in the life sciences and medicine had policies requiring deposit of data as-
sociated with published articles.14 
Debate within the scientific community over the disclosure obligations 
of publishing scientists reached a fevered pitch with the publication of an 
article in the prestigious Science magazine announcing the completion of 
the human genome sequence by scientists at the private firm Celera.15 Al-
though Celera made its sequence data available free of charge from its 
own website, access was restricted along certain dimensions, including 
quantitative limitations on the amount of data that could be downloaded, a 
prohibition on redistribution, and additional limitations on commercial 
users.16  
The National Research Council of the elite National Academy of Sci-
ences17 entered into the debate by forming a Committee on Responsibili-
ties of Authorship in the Biological Sciences to examine the topic of shar-
ing published data and materials. The Committee issued a report that 
called upon authors to include in their publications or otherwise make 
freely available “the data, algorithms, or other information that is central 
or integral to the publication—that is, whatever is necessary to support the 
                                                                                                                         
velopments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 
(1999). 
 12.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FINDING THE PATH: ISSUES OF ACCESS TO 
RESEARCH RESOURCES (1999), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/9629.html#toc 
[hereinafter FINDING THE PATH]; SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6. 
 13. See, e.g., FINDING THE PATH, supra note 12; SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, su-
pra note 6. 
 14. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 33 tbl.2-1. 
 15. J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304 
(2001). 
 16. Science Online, Accessing the Celera Human Genome Sequence Data, http://-
www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/announcement/gsp.dtl (last visited July 6, 2006). 
 17. Membership in the National Academy of Sciences is restricted to those scientists 
who have made highly significant contributions in their fields.  
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major claims of the paper and would enable one skilled in the art to verify 
or replicate the claims.”18 The report further indicated that authors should 
provide data “in a form on which other scientists can build with subse-
quent research.”19 In this regard, it specifically condemned the terms of 
access to the Celera human genome sequence data as “not consistent with 
the principles laid out in this report,” noting that it permitted only “static 
access” for purposes of validation and not “dynamic access” for use in fur-
ther research.20 
Another important focus of debate has been the timing of data disclo-
sure. The traditional trigger for data sharing in academic research is publi-
cation of research results. Large data sets, though, may not be ripe for pub-
lication in a prestigious journal until long after they are generated. Thus, 
research projects that aim to create large data sets over an extended period 
of time have presented special challenges for the implementation of data 
sharing norms.   
In the genomics context, a series of international collaborative research 
efforts to create community resources for widespread use have prescribed 
data sharing policies that call for disclosure prior to publication.21 In addi-
tion to facilitating prompt access to data for use in subsequent research, 
some of these efforts have also aimed to defeat corresponding patents, in-
cluding patents on downstream inventions resulting from the data.22 
Within genomics, public research sponsors like NIH and the U.K.’s Well-
come Trust have applied normative pressure to achieve widespread data 
dissemination.  
Outside the context of genomics, NIH has sought to use its leverage as 
a research sponsor to guide the data sharing practices of its grantees.23 In 
recent years NIH has required researchers applying for more than 
                                                                                                                         
 18. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 5. 
 19. Id. at 34. 
 20. Id. at 48 box 3-2. 
 21. See, e.g., The Human Genome Program of the U.S. Department of Energy Of-
fice of Science, Summary of Principles Agreed at the First International Strategy Meeting 
on Human Genome Sequencing—Bermuda (Feb. 25-28, 1996), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/-
techresources/Human_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml#1; WELLCOME TRUST, SHARING 
DATA FROM LARGE-SCALE BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROJECTS: A SYSTEM OF TRIPARTITE 
RESPONSIBILITY (2003), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/assets/wtd003207.pdf 
[hereinafter TRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITY]. 
 22. See International HapMap Project, Genotype Access Registration, http://www.-
hapmap.org/cgi-perl/registration (last visited July 6, 2006). 
 23.  See NIH, NOTICE NOT-OD-03-032, FINAL NIH STATEMENT ON SHARING RE-
SEARCH DATA (2003), available at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-
OD-03-032.html [hereinafter NIH STATEMENT].  
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$500,000 in funding to submit a plan for data sharing.24 NIH cites a com-
pelling list of arguments in support of such sharing, including reinforcing 
open scientific inquiry, facilitating new research, encouraging diversity of 
analysis and opinions, enabling the exploration of topics not envisioned by 
the original investigators, and permitting the creation of new data sets that 
combine data from different sources. The policy stops short of mandating 
data sharing, however, acknowledging the competing interest of “protect-
ing confidential and proprietary data.”25 
While these international and federal initiatives provide useful bench-
marks for CIRM to consider in formulating its own approach to data shar-
ing, they do not constrain CIRM. In the patent context, the pervasive in-
fluence of the Bayh-Dole Act on publicly-sponsored research institutions 
is likely to constrain even a relatively large state-sponsored research initia-
tive such as CIRM. These institutions actively seek and already hold many 
patents on stem cell technology.26 By contrast, intellectual property rights 
for data are less clearly defined and institutional practices are less stan-
dardized. Given the variability in approaches to data sharing within the 
biomedical research community, CIRM may be well-positioned by virtue 
of the scale of its operation and the scarcity of federal funding for stem 
cell research to take a leadership role in setting the terms for data sharing 
in this context.  
This Article discusses data sharing in California’s stem cell initiative 
against the background of other data sharing efforts and in light of the 
competing interests that CIRM is directed to balance.27 We begin by con-
sidering how IP law affects data sharing. We then assess the strategic con-
siderations that guide the IP and data policies and strategies of federal, 
state, and private research sponsors. With this background, we discuss 
four specific sets of issues that public sponsors of data-rich research, in-
cluding CIRM, are likely to confront: (1) how to motivate researchers to 
contribute data; (2) who should have access to the data and on what condi-
                                                                                                                         
 24.  NIH, NIH DATA SHARING POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE (2003), 
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_sharing_guidance.htm 
[hereinafter NIH DATA SHARING POLICY]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The most significant university patents are held by the Wisconsin Alumni Re-
search Foundation (WARF). WARF holds broad patents on both embryonic stem cell 
lines in general and human embryonic stem cell lines in particular.  
 27. For purposes of this Article’s analysis, we take these interests as a given. Thus, 
we do not evaluate, for example, whether CIRM’s interest in providing financial benefit 
to the State of California is appropriate. Rather, we confine our analysis to possible con-
flict between the various CIRM interests.  
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tions; (3) what data get deposited and when; and (4) how to establish data-
base architecture and curate and maintain the database. 
II. THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN 
DATA SHARING  
Neither copyright nor patent law offers federal statutory protection for 
data as such. Indeed, both copyright law and patent law treat the informa-
tional content of writings and inventions as a spillover benefit for the pub-
lic, while limiting the exclusionary rights of creators to something else: an 
original expression in the case of copyright,28 and a product or process in 
the case of patent.29  
On one reading, the failure to protect information under either patent 
or copyright law suggests that information gets no respect. This is the 
sense that emerges from reading copyright cases like Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.,30 in which the Supreme Court re-
                                                                                                                         
 28.  Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that 
an alphabetized list of names and phone numbers lacked the minimum originality neces-
sary for copyright protection, even though considerable effort may have gone into creat-
ing it).  
 29.  Patentable subject matter is limited by statute to any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), all generally 
understood to be distinct from data or information. The subject matter boundaries of the 
patent system have been diminishing in recent judicial decisions in the face of creative 
claiming strategies for new technologies, particularly information technology. See, e.g., 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Last term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of 
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 370 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 543 (2005), vacated, reconsidered, and cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005), limiting the scope of its review to the question of pat-
entable subject matter. Ultimately the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted, with three justices dissenting. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2976, 2921 (Breyer, J. with whom Stevens, J. and Souter, J. join, 
dissenting). Although the case ultimately failed to generate an authoritative opinion from 
a majority of the Supreme Court, the numerous amicus briefs filed in support of the de-
fendant suggest a surprising level of discomfort in the business community with the trend 
toward more expansive patent eligibility. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: 
Looking Backward While Moving Forward, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317 (2006). 
 30.  499 U.S. 340 (1991). The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for 
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used 
in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as op-
posed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they pos-
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jected a claim of copyright in an alphabetized list of names and phone 
numbers. In this story, copyright law treats information as a mere byprod-
uct of efforts that deserve protection only insofar as they yield some other, 
more creative output. Contemporary critics charge that copyright law has 
failed to appreciate the importance of information as an artifact of human 
ingenuity with value in its own right. In this view, as this value grows and 
becomes more vulnerable to misappropriation with the expanding capa-
bilities of IT, this limitation on legal rights becomes more anomalous.31 
From another perspective, the failure to protect data may reflect a rev-
erence for information. Information is so valuable that society will not 
permit it to be monopolized. This is the sense that emerges from reading 
cases about disclosure in the patent system, in which courts treat the in-
formational content of patent applications as the public’s quid pro quo that 
justifies the issuance of patents.32 In this story, disclosure of unprotected 
information is not an incidental byproduct of a process that aims to moti-
vate something more worthwhile, but is the whole purpose of the system. 
We promote disclosure of precious information by rewarding disclosure 
with exclusionary rights in something else. 
By requiring public disclosure of information about an invention while 
limiting the exclusive rights to the inventions defined in claims, patent law 
                                                                                                                         
sess some creative spark, “‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be . . . 
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between 
creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created 
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence . . . [O]ne who discovers a fact is 
not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’ ‘The discoverer merely finds and records.’” Id. at 345-47 
(citations omitted). 
 31.  See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship, 
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (R. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
 32.  See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“When a 
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and 
those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are 
of such importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the 
high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, 
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the 
art.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he 
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new ideas and technologies into the public 
domain through disclosure. State law protection for ideas and designs whose disclosure 
has already been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the 
patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further 
innovation.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) 
(“[The inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consid-
eration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is 
granted.”). 
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not only fails to protect information but actually pushes it into the public 
domain as a spillover.33 Yet, while the information disclosed in a patent 
application is publicly available, the exclusionary rights from the patent 
might still protect the patent owner from its unauthorized use if the use 
involves infringing the patent claims. If an inventor discloses in a patent 
application how to make and use a new mousetrap and a patent issues with 
claims drawn to the mousetrap, anyone who follows the directions in the 
disclosure to make and use the claimed mousetrap would be liable for in-
fringement. A reader, on the other hand, who uses the disclosed informa-
tion to problem-solve and devise a new spring-loaded device falling out-
side the scope of the mousetrap patent claims would not be liable, though 
the patent disclosure may have been invaluable to the reader in solving his 
problem. While patent claims legally constrain the use of information dis-
closed in patent specifications, the public disclosure of the information 
may also facilitate other non-infringing uses of that information.  
Patent law concerning the scope of “prior art” that is used to evaluate 
the patentability of inventions has complex effects on incentives for in-
formation disclosure. The rules of patentability count all publicly available 
information, including the inventor’s own disclosures, as prior art.34 Con-
sequently, those who hope to file patent applications may be inclined to 
defer disclosure of data until after filing related patent applications. On the 
other hand, those who wish to defeat the potential patent applications of 
their scientific or commercial rivals may disclose information early in the 
hope of creating more prior art.35 The creation of patent-defeating prior art 
                                                                                                                         
 33. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”). An inventor who 
fails to file a patent application within a year of putting an invention to use loses the right 
to obtain a U.S. patent, id. § 102(b), forcing inventors to choose promptly between enter-
ing into the bargain of disclosure in exchange for a patent or secrecy and loss of right to 
patent. 
 34.  Id. §§ 102-103. An inventor’s own disclosures will not defeat the novelty of an 
invention under U.S. law because they do not show prior invention, knowledge, or use by 
another prior to the invention date, id. § 102(a), (g), but they may nonetheless give rise to 
a “statutory bar” against a patent if the disclosure occurred more than a year before the 
inventor’s filing date. Id. § 102(b). 
 35.  See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000); 
Douglas Lichtman, Kate Kraus & Scott Baker, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strate-
gic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 2358 (2000). 
1196 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3 
 
appears to have played a role in the development of disclosure rules for 
some large-scale biological resource projects.36 
III. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SPONSORS IN DATA 
SHARING 
A. Private Sponsors 
Absent statutory protection, such as a patent or copyright, that survives 
beyond disclosure, a standard commercial strategy for preserving the value 
of data and databases has been secrecy, or more accurately, restricted ac-
cess. Some owners of valuable databases permit only internal access to the 
data. Others make data available only to paying subscribers under the 
terms of database access agreements. Such owners may protect their data-
bases as trade secrets, or at a minimum, under the law of contracts. Even 
without having to enforce legal rights in court, database owners may exer-
cise considerable practical control over data sharing by restricting online 
access to databases to only particular internet addresses.  
These strategies allow database owners to exclude free riders, and per-
haps thereby capture enough value to justify creating the database. All the 
same, they are wasteful from a social perspective. These strategies restrict 
the dissemination of information that would have greater social value if 
more widely used and that could be made freely available at minimal cost. 
Restricting access leads to socially wasteful duplication as competitors 
create similar databases for their own use. It encumbers data consolida-
tion, making it more difficult to aggregate data from multiple sources to 
create more comprehensive databases. Nonetheless, trade secrecy, con-
tracts, and digital technology have an important role to play in encourag-
ing firms to invest in the creation of databases.  
B. Public Sponsors 
The case for trade secrecy and other measures is weaker for informa-
tion generated at public expense. Public funding mitigates concerns about 
the adequacy of incentives to generate information and makes the social 
waste inherent in secrecy more troubling. While some value may be cre-
ated by interactions between creators and users of data when creators con-
trol access to data, broad dissemination often better serves the mission of 
public sponsors to advance science.37 Further, data disclosure can provide 
                                                                                                                         
 36  See infra Part IV.A. and note 79. 
 37. Compare Ashish Arora & Robert Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property 
Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004) (discussing value 
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a valuable check on fraudulent research claims. This risk has, regrettably, 
become salient in the recent experience of stem cell research.38 Data dis-
closure also provides a check against over-claiming in the political arena, 
another concern for stem cell research.39  
Public sponsors have an interest not only in advancing science but also 
in ensuring that research discoveries made in the course of funded re-
search are effectively disseminated and practically utilized. The Bayh-
Dole Act emphasizes this interest and aims to promote it by encouraging 
grantees to patent their inventions and then to license these patents to 
firms that will undertake further development and commercialization.40 
The theory is that licenses, especially exclusive licenses, will provide nec-
essary protection against competition during the risky and costly commer-
cialization process. Although one might expect the interests of state spon-
sors to be similar to those of the federal government, CIRM in fact faces 
more significant (and more parochial) constraints under the terms of 
Proposition 71.  
                                                                                                                         
of customization of research inputs for particular users), with NIH STATEMENT, supra 
note 23. 
 38.  See Sei Chong & Dennis Normile, How Young Korean Researchers Helped Un-
earth a Scandal. . . And How the Problems Eluded Peer Reviewers and Editors, 311 SCI. 
22-25 (2006). 
 39.  See David A. Shaywitz, Stem Cell Hype and Hope, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006, 
at A21. 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 200. Other interests noted in the Bayh-Dole statute include encour-
aging participation of small business firms in federally supported research and develop-
ment (R&D), promoting collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit or-
ganizations, promoting competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future 
R&D, promoting “the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in 
the United States by United States industry and labor,” ensuring that the government ob-
tains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet its needs, and minimizing 
administrative costs. Id. Federal research sponsors are not charged by statute with recov-
ering revenues from technologies patented by grantees except in the case of inventions 
made in a government-owned, contractor-operated facility (i.e. a national laboratory). 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7), sponsors are directed to include in funding agreements re-
quirements for sharing royalties with inventors and for using remaining income, after 
payment of costs, to support scientific research or education. A different rule applies to 
funding agreements for the operation of a government-owned, contractor-operated facil-
ity; these agreements are to require payment to the U.S. Treasury of 75% of the excess 
revenues after payment of expenses if the balance exceeds 5% of the annual budget of the 
facility. Id. § 202(c)(7)(E). Although the Bayh-Dole Act directs grantees to give a prefer-
ence in the award of exclusive licenses to firms that agree to manufacture the invention in 
the United States, if that constraint proves to be problematic, then the sponsor may waive 
it. Id. § 204. 
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In addition to promoting the development of stem cell therapies, 
Proposition 71 identifies a number of goals that are more narrowly fo-
cused on the interests of California constituencies, including: to “[p]rotect 
and benefit the California budget . . . by providing an opportunity for the 
state to benefit from royalties, patents, and licensing fees that result from 
the research”; to “[b]enefit the California economy by creating projects, 
jobs, and therapies that will generate millions of dollars in new tax reve-
nues in our state”; and to “[a]dvance the biotech industry in California to 
world leadership, as an economic engine for California’s future.”41 Propo-
sition 71 enhances the likelihood that the California focus of these goals 
will be taken to heart by requiring California institutional affiliations for 
each member of the ICOC, the committee charged with governing 
CIRM.42  
Of course, it is not at all surprising that a California voter initiative that 
appropriates $3 billion in research funding would promote the interests of 
California constituencies. Indeed, in the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal gov-
ernment made a similar move to promote the interests of U.S. firms by 
directing recipients of U.S. research funding to give preferences for exclu-
sive licenses to firms that would manufacture in the U.S.43 These strate-
gies allow taxpayers to capture more of the benefits of tax-funded pro-
grams. To the extent that spillovers to non-local interests limit incentives 
for governments to invest in research and development (“R&D”), such 
strategies may be necessary to encourage government-funded R&D.  
Nonetheless, state-focused preferences in the management of intellec-
tual property are more limiting than national preferences, and thus are 
more troubling. If state-sponsored R&D initiatives become more preva-
lent, a proliferation of local preferences could threaten to balkanize valu-
able IP among the states, making it difficult for firms to collect the rights 
needed to move forward with product development. Even a single state-
sponsored research initiative such as CIRM could significantly restrict dis-
semination through local preferences if it controls access to broad, cross-
cutting technologies, like stem cells, that may have implications for a 
range of problems.44 
                                                                                                                         
 41.  Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147. 
 42.  Id. at 147-48; California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 125290.20(a) (2006). 
 43. Note, though, that if that constraint proves to be problematic, the sponsor may 
waive it. 35 U.S.C. § 204. 
 44. It is interesting to compare the interests of state research sponsors in furthering 
the interests of local constituents with the interests of private research sponsors in further-
ing the interests of shareholders. Private sponsors are unlikely to care whether the money 
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Moreover, in contrast to the Bayh-Dole Act, Proposition 71 directs 
CIRM to recoup revenues for the California state treasury.45 This revenue 
goal is in tension not only with the goal of ensuring widespread dissemina-
tion of research results, but also, to a lesser degree, with the goal of com-
mercialization. To the extent that product developers are expected to re-
turn money to the state treasury, such a requirement acts as a tax on com-
mercialization. 
Although the Bayh-Dole Act and Proposition 71 focus on patent rights 
in technologies emerging from sponsored research, data sharing in the 
context of sponsored research poses similar tradeoffs between capturing 
value for political constituencies and promoting scientific progress.  
IV. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FOR CIRM 
The challenge for CIRM is to capture an adequate return for its con-
stituents on its investment in stem cell research without unduly limiting its 
overall social value. In examining this challenge, we address four highly 
interdependent issues that any effort to promote data sharing must con-
sider:46 (1) incentives to contribute data; (2) who gets access and under 
what conditions; (3) what gets deposited and when; and (4) database archi-
tecture, maintenance, and curation. Throughout our discussion, we draw 
upon the experiences of prior database initiatives, particularly those at the 
federal level, which have attempted to promote widespread dissemination 
and sharing. In the absence of information on the specific research CIRM 
is likely to fund, we make these observations at a relatively high level of 
generality.  
A. Incentives to Contribute Data 
In order to be effective, data release policies must give scientists clear 
incentives to contribute their data. This Section focuses on incentives in 
                                                                                                                         
they are making emanates from activity in California or in Massachusetts, and are there-
fore less likely to restrict dissemination on the basis of geography. On the other hand, 
private sponsors may be less likely than state counterparts to disseminate information in 
ways that benefit the public but do not benefit their own bottom lines. CIRM might be 
content to spend money in ways that mean more medical treatments and more jobs for 
California voters even if no money flows back to the state coffers, but commercial firms 
that are obligated to return value to shareholders cannot afford to be so public-spirited.  
 45. Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147. 
 46. For purposes of this article, we put to one side thorny problems regarding pri-
vacy that might be raised by data associated with personally identifiable information. We 
will assume that data involved in stem cell research would not trigger concerns about 
personally identifiable information or that the data could be effectively de-identified to 
address such concerns.  
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two somewhat distinct contexts: centralized data production projects and 
more decentralized, investigator-driven science. 
As a general matter, incentives are necessary because most rewards in 
research science, including academic appointments, promotion, and grant 
funding, depend on a record of frequent publication. Scientists may per-
ceive sharing data, even after an initial publication, as providing advan-
tages to competitors in the race to generate further publications. Scientists 
may also be reluctant to share data because of involvement in commercial 
activities. Sharing may imperil patent applications or destroy trade se-
crecy. Emerging evidence reveals that some research communities in the 
life sciences are reluctant to share data even after publication. For exam-
ple, a survey conducted by Eric Campbell and his colleagues found that 
47% of academic geneticists who had made a request to another academic 
had been denied access to data or materials associated with a published 
article at least once in the preceding three years.47 Scientific competition 
and commercial involvement were both important predictors of refusal to 
share.48 
Although NIH now requires grant applicants to include a data sharing 
plan in grant applications exceeding $500,000 per year,49 so far it has done 
little to enforce compliance. If CIRM wants its grantees to share data, it 
should consider mechanisms for ensuring compliance from the outset in 
order to offset the powerful incentives that scientists face to withhold ac-
cess to data. Mechanisms might include rewards for compliance or sanc-
tions for noncompliance, such as loss of continued funding. A possible 
reward might involve privileged access to data analysis tools for those 
who contribute data to an archive. CIRM could also track downloads of 
                                                                                                                         
 47. Eric Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a 
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 477 (2002). The Campbell study did not distinguish 
between data and tangible materials. Because one important impediment to sharing iden-
tified by the study—the effort and financial cost associated with replication and transfer, 
id. at 478, —is much lower for data than for tangible materials, the study may overesti-
mate impediments to data disclosure. Cf. John Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents 
and Materials Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002 (2005) (indicating that problems in transfer of 
tangible materials appear to have risen since Campbell’s study, but not addressing the 
question of data). Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, a series of workshops and reports 
emanating from the biomedical research community confirms a growing perception of 
departures from the principle of data sharing upon publication.  
 48. See Campbell, supra note 47, at 478. 
 49. See NIH DATA SHARING POLICY, supra note 24. 
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data from a centralized archive and give special acknowledgements or 
other rewards to scientists whose data was downloaded frequently.50  
It may be easier to achieve compliance with a data sharing plan within 
a tightly knit community of scientists. For example, at the height of the 
Human Genome Project (HGP), the five major production labs that con-
tributed large amounts of sequence to the public GenBank database tele-
conferenced on a weekly basis.51 In this environment the normative pres-
sure to comply with data disclosure—even pre-publication disclosure—
was unusually strong. Some data users from the HGP and other commu-
nity resource projects have also argued that widespread data availability 
was the quid pro quo for the major centers receiving large sums of money 
to complete these projects without undergoing peer review of each indi-
vidual portion.52 CIRM may be able to create similar normative pressure 
to comply with data disclosure obligations if it funds large-scale, central-
ized data production.53  
It bears emphasis, though, that researchers in the HGP were motivated 
not only by a public-spirited desire to make data quickly available (with-
out any background patents on associated material)54 but also by a com-
petitive desire to outdo rival private sector efforts. Measures of the volume 
of data accumulating in GenBank served as a conspicuous marker of ac-
celerating productivity for the HGP. Public availability served as a salient 
point of distinction from the proprietary databases of commercial rivals. 
                                                                                                                         
 50. Although rewards of this sort might not be as attractive as preserving exclusive 
access so as to mine the data for additional publications (particularly if university tenure 
and promotion committees continue their current practice of considering publication to be 
the primary benchmark of success), they might provide some incentive. 
 51. JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF SCI-
ENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME 193 (2002) (discussing the Friday 
conference calls that took place among the “G5” to coordinate activities).  
 52. Steven Salzberg et al., Unrestricted Free Access Works and Must Continue, 422 
NATURE 801 (2003) (correspondence from bioinformaticians arguing that obligations of 
scientists in large-scale data production centers differ from those of traditional scientists).  
 53. For example, CIRM might fund a group of centers to produce data on gene ex-
pression at different stages of stem cell differentiation.  
 54. In February 1996, scientists from the major sequencing centers in the HGP ex-
plicitly disavowed patenting. Eliot Marsh, Data Sharing: Genome Researchers Take the 
Pledge, 272 SCI. 477, 477 (1996). NIH followed up with an April 1996 policy statement 
strongly discouraging patenting by HGP grantees. National Human Genome Research 
Institute, NHGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property of Human Genomic Sequence—
Apr. 9, 1996, http://www.genome.gov/10000926. Though it may be in some tension with 
Bayh-Dole, this “no patenting norm” has also been part of subsequent NIH-sponsored 
“community resource” projects. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public 
Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289 (2003). 
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Public access helped to justify continued public support for a project that 
appeared to duplicate work being done in the private sector. Moreover, 
rapid data availability might have been expected to frustrate commercial 
rivals by creating prior art to defeat future gene sequence patents.55 Rapid 
public disclosure also undermined the viability of private sector business 
models that entailed charging license fees for database access. Although 
they were able to raise investment capital to create their databases, private 
sector rivals were ultimately not able to survive in the database business.56  
Given its mandate to “[a]dvance the biotech industry in California to 
world leadership, as an economic engine for California’s future,”57 it 
seems unlikely that CIRM would want to drive out private sector data pro-
ducers in any large-scale data production efforts that it might fund. CIRM 
might, therefore, count impediments to private R&D as a cost to weigh 
against the benefits of a public domain approach to research inputs like 
data. A public domain approach eliminates the significant costs that are 
likely to be associated with negotiating access, but it also imposes some 
costs of its own. In addition to making public funding necessary in many 
cases, aggressive versions of a public domain approach may undermine 
the types of small firms that tend to provide specialized research inputs in 
the marketplace. To the extent that these foregone market incentives for 
innovation by specialized firms are superior to the incentives that operate 
                                                                                                                         
 55. Although raw genomic data would not undermine claims to specific genes of 
identified function, annotated data might do so. A major goal of annotation is to identify 
coding regions in the genome and add information about the function of the protein for 
which the region codes. A recent empirical study suggests that at least 20% of human 
genes are in fact covered by patents; some genes are covered by multiple patents. See 
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 
310 SCI. 239 (2005). The extent to which these patents are valid over the prior art is un-
clear.  
 56. The major private sector rival to the public database, Celera Genomics led by 
Craig Venter, was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to charge for its database and re-
leased its data into the public domain. Emma Marris, Free Genome Databases Finally 
Defeat Celera, 435 NATURE 6 (2005). Although public availability of the human genome 
avoids the potentially crippling costs that might have been associated with negotiating 
access, and is thus a welcome development, the presence of a private sector rival had 
some benefit. The private sector effort arguably provided the competition necessary for 
the public sector to work efficiently. In particular, private sector competition may have 
been the catalyst necessary to overcome the public sector’s resistance to the whole ge-
nome shotgun sequencing approach, a methodology that has proved to be successful. See 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Ten-
sion?, 131 DAEDALUS 89 (2002). 
 57. Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147. 
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in large, vertically integrated firms or in the public sector,58 that cost may 
be significant.  
Unlike the HGP, most community resource projects in genomics have 
not sought to drive out private sector competitors. These projects may 
therefore provide a more appropriate model for CIRM. Non-HGP commu-
nity resource projects have, of course, lacked the incentives for disclosure 
provided by a race with a high-profile private sector competitor. They 
have made up for the absence of such incentives, however, by explicitly 
seeking to preserve some of the rewards of publication for scientists who 
contribute to public databases prior to publication. A report from the 
Wellcome Trust on Sharing Data from Large-Scale Biological Research 
Projects: A System of Tripartite Responsibility proposes that producers of 
database resources publish a project description at the beginning of the 
project describing their plans.59 These project descriptions should provide 
for production, analysis, and release of the data and give a citation for ref-
erencing the sources of the data.60 The Wellcome Trust report not only 
admonishes data users to cite the proper reference source but it also urges 
them to “recognize that the resource producers have a legitimate interest in 
publishing prominent peer-reviewed reports describing and analyzing the 
resource that they have produced . . . .” Indeed, the report indicates that 
data users might best “promote the highest standards of respect for the sci-
entific contribution of others,” by discussing or coordinating their publica-
tion plans with resource producers.61 In comparable community resource 
projects, CIRM could use its leverage with both data producers and the 
data users it funds to encourage compliance with these suggested princi-
ples. 
There is an obvious tension between preserving opportunities for those 
who disclose data to publish their own future analyses and allowing out-
side users full access to the data. Unlike the Wellcome Trust report, which 
does not endorse explicit delays on publication by outside data users, some 
community resource projects have tried to restrict publication. One exam-
ple is the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN),62 a public-
private partnership of the NIH and several private firms, currently Pfizer, 
                                                                                                                         
 58. See Arora & Merges, supra note 37; Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technol-
ogy and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 419 
(2001). 
 59. See TRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21. 
 60. Id. at 3-4. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Home Page, http://www.fnih.org/-
GAIN/GAIN_home.shtml (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). 
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Affymetrix, and Abbott Laboratories.63 GAIN aims to understand the 
complex set of genetic factors influencing risk for common diseases by 
conducting a series of whole genome association studies that employ sam-
ples from patients with such diseases.64 The GAIN publication policy 
gives contributing investigators a period of nine months during which they 
have the exclusive right to submit publications based on their data.65 At 
the same time, the policy gives approved users, who sign a restrictive 
agreement, access to the data during this period.66 CIRM may need to con-
sider whether the type of formal restriction on publication adopted by 
GAIN unduly favors initial producers of data relative to subsequent users. 
In any event, the model adopted for community resource projects in 
genomics is likely to be inappropriate for decentralized, investigator-
initiated work. Detailed information about the characteristics of all avail-
able stem cell lines, for example, is likely to emerge not from a top-down 
data production effort, but rather from decentralized contributions of indi-
vidual labs. Stem cell scientists would presumably generate such informa-
tion as they worked with, and published on, particular lines. A database 
that accumulated such information, which some stem cell scientists have 
proposed,67 might include details of derivation, genetic details, and results 
indicating pluripotence and antibody markers.  
For such work, the federally funded Protein Data Bank (PDB) may be 
a better model. In 1971, a group of crystallographers established the PDB 
as a centralized repository for three-dimensional protein structure data. 
Deposit of structures, though, did not begin in earnest until the 1980s, as 
the community began to see collective advantages of deposition. In 1989, 
the International Union of Crystallography (IUCr) reinforced community 
views by calling on researchers to deposit data once they submitted for 
publication a research article based on the data.68 Actual data release, 
                                                                                                                         
 63. See Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Partnerships, http://www.fnih.org/-
GAIN/Partnerships.shtml (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). 
 64. See Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Overview, http://www.fnih.org/-
GAIN/Background.shtml#Program (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). 
 65. Foundation for the NIH, Policies and Procedures: GAIN Publication Policy, 
http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/policies.shtml#Publication (last visited Aug. 3, 2006) [herein-
after GAIN Publication Policy]; Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Data Use Certification 
Terms of Access, http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/documents/Data_Use_Certification.pdf, ¶ 6 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter GAIN Terms of Access]. 
 66. GAIN Publication Policy, supra note 65. 
 67. Krishanu Saha, Navigating to the Right Stem Cell Line (working paper, on file 
with authors). A preliminary version of such a database is currently available at The Stem 
Cell Community, http://www.stemcellcommunity.org (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).  
 68. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 74-75. 
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however, did not have to be immediate: the IUCr allowed researchers to 
request a one-year hold before public release of the data by the database.69 
IUCr justified this one-year hold as a reward for the difficulties in deter-
mining protein structure. As these difficulties decreased, leaders within the 
community began to call for immediate release of data upon publication. 
In 1999, the NIH announced a policy of data release upon publication for 
its grantees.70 Major scientific journals such as Science and Nature now 
require data deposition in PDB as a condition of publication.71  
In contrast with recent community resource projects in genomics, the 
PDB effort does not have a prohibition on patenting. Although the PDB 
does not keep track of background patents,72 protein structure data could 
be associated with background patents on the gene, protein crystal, or per-
haps even on a computer model of a protein binding pocket that purports 
to allow the investigator to test drug candidates.73 In a decentralized pro-
ject such as PDB, a prohibition on patents might have served as a signifi-
cant disincentive to scientific participation.  
The PDB story exemplifies cooperation between scientific leaders in 
the protein crystallographic community and research sponsors over several 
decades to make data deposition an essential aspect of publication.74 A 
similar combination of sustained sponsor pressure and leadership from key 
leaders in the stem cell community may also be critical in order for data 
sharing in routine CIRM-funded work to succeed.  
B. Access: By Whom and Under What Conditions 
Incentives to contribute are also likely to be affected by scientists’ per-
ceptions regarding who may access their contributions, and under what 
conditions. The issue of access is an important one, both for ensuring 
maximum benefit from CIRM-sponsored research and for determining 
how CIRM, and the state of California more generally, reap returns on 
their investment.  
A pure public domain approach to scientific resources would place no 
restrictions on who could seek access or on what they could seek. In the 
                                                                                                                         
 69. Id. at 75. 
 70. Id. at 76. 
 71. See Science, Database Deposition Policy, http://www.sciencemag.org/about/-
authors/prep/gen_info.dtl#datadep (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). 
 72. Telephone Interview with Helen Berman, Professor, Department of Chemistry 
and Chemical Biology, Rutgers University, in Piscataway, N.J. (Mar. 2, 2005). Professor 
Berman is a leader of the PDB community. 
 73. Although the last category of patent appears quite close to a patent on data, the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office has issued such patents. 
 74. Interview with Helen Berman, supra note 72. 
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area of publication-related biomedical materials, CIRM has already de-
parted from a pure public domain approach in favor of a policy that favors 
California researchers. The CIRM IPPNPO requires grantees to share 
biomedical materials described in published scientific articles within 60 
days of receiving a request for such materials. But the IPPNPO appears to 
limit grantee obligations to those who are seeking the materials for “re-
search purposes in California.”75  
CIRM might similarly choose a tiered approach to data access in order 
to benefit various constituents. It might, for example, permit access by: (1) 
CIRM-funded nonprofit researchers only; (2) all CIRM-funded research-
ers; (3) all California researchers; (4) all stem cell researchers who had 
contributed their own data (and/or agreed to contribute their own annota-
tions/improvements to the database); or (5) all stem cell researchers. Cer-
tain categories of researchers could be excluded altogether or could be 
given access under restrictive conditions. CIRM could require for-profit 
institutions, or non-California institutions, to pay for access. Non-price 
methods of tiering, such as early access by certain favored categories of 
researchers, could favor preferred groups while still permitting broad ac-
cess. 
Providing preferential access to CIRM-funded researchers, or to re-
searchers based in California, could promote Proposition 71’s goal of 
stimulating the California economy. Charging for-profit institutions for 
access may promote its goal of direct returns to the California budget. Fur-
thermore, giving preference to those who themselves contribute data, 
whether through initial contributions or through improvements or annota-
tions to the initial contribution, could provide an additional incentive to 
contribute.  
These benefits come at some cost though: the more conditions CIRM 
places on access, the more potential investigators are excluded. Moreover, 
because data are not protected by intellectual property rights, contract-
based access must specifically include restrictions against the possibility 
of dissemination to third parties. Thus, in order for any contractual restric-
tions to be effective, they must include a restriction on further dissemina-
tion. 
Again, recent experience with publicly funded genomics databases 
provides a useful background for examining the costs and benefits of re-
stricting access. In the case of the HGP, data were released into the public 
                                                                                                                         
 75. IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 16. Similarly, the IPPNPO restricts its requirement 
that CIRM-funded patents materials be made available for research purposes to “Califor-
nia research institutions.” Id.  
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domain without restriction. The public domain approach was chosen over 
the objection of some public sector scientists who did not view creating 
prior art as the best weapon for defeating proprietary claims. Because the 
data were freely available, those who accessed the data could blend it with 
their own privately-held information and make the combination proprie-
tary.76 These scientists suspected that Craig Venter, the major private sec-
tor challenger to the HGP, had adopted this approach.77 
The frustration of these public sector scientists appears to have influ-
enced the approach toward data sharing in subsequent community re-
source projects. For example, the International Haplotype Map (HapMap) 
project, which receives funding from both the NIH and the Wellcome 
Trust, initially took a very different approach to data release. In that case, 
the raw data on single base DNA variations, also known as single nucleo-
tide polymorphisms (SNPs), were not released into the public domain. 
Rather, they were made available via a clickwrap license explicitly mod-
eled on the General Public License (GPL) used by open source software 
developers.78 Until December 2004, when the license restrictions were 
lifted, the license prohibited licensees from combining the data with their 
own so as to seek product patents on combinations of SNPs known as hap-
lotypes.79  
The HapMap experience illustrates some of the difficulties involved in 
adapting the GPL to the release of biomedical research data.80 First, the 
                                                                                                                         
 76. SULSTON & FERRY, supra note 51, at 211-13.  
 77. There is some controversy over the extent to which the Venter project actually 
relied on the public data. Compare Robert H. Waterston et al., More on the Sequencing of 
the Human Genome, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3022, 3024 (2003) (claiming that Cel-
era’s assembly is “appropriately viewed as a refinement built on the HGP assemblies”) 
with Mark D. Adams et al., The Independence of Our Genome Assemblies, 100 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3025, 3026 (2003) (claiming that Celera produced an “independent 
assembly” and that HGP contribution to the structure and content was minimal). 
 78. International HapMap Project, Public Access License–Version 1.1, Aug. 2003, 
http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-perl/registration [hereinafter HapMap License]. The HapMap 
License includes an acknowledgement to the GNU General Public License of the Free 
Software Foundation. Id. 
 79. See id. ¶ 2(b)(i) (“[Y]ou shall not file any patent applications that contain claims 
to any composition of matter of any single nucleotide polymorphism (‘SNP’), genotype 
or haplotype data obtained from the Genotype Database or any SNP, haplotype or haplo-
type block based on data obtained from the Genotype Database.”) Haplotypes are SNP 
clusters that are inherited together. Haplotypes associated with particular phenotypes can 
be used as markers for diagnostic tests and drug targets. See generally International 
HapMap Project, What is the HapMap?, http://www.hapmap.org/whatishapmap.html.en 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2006).  
 80. For a general discussion of “open source” approaches in biomedical research, 
see Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in 
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GPL is structured as a license to intellectual property rights. In the context 
of open source software, the licensed rights consist of copyright in soft-
ware, a right that has been recognized both by Congress and by the courts. 
Under U.S. law, there is no comparable intellectual property right in data 
to anchor the HapMap license. The HapMap license denies this difficulty, 
requiring those who would access the data to acknowledge, contrary to 
legal authority, that the data are protected by U.S. copyright law.81  
Second, because there is no property right that survives disclosure to 
those not bound by the license, in order to ensure that third parties do not 
gain access to the data without agreeing to the terms of the license, the 
HapMap license imposes tight restrictions on dissemination. Researchers 
who accessed the data prior to December 2004 could not release the data 
to anyone who was not bound by the same license terms. Most notably, 
they could not include the data in publications based on the data.82  
Third, the GPL is designed to preclude all downstream restrictions on 
dissemination, an approach that is possible in the area of software, where 
intellectual property has never been a particularly strong driver of R&D. 
In contrast, in the biopharmaceutical area, patents—particularly down-
stream patents on therapeutics—are clearly important. The HapMap li-
cense seeks to avoid imperiling downstream patents that might matter for 
future product development through the use of complex and ambiguous 
license provisions. These provisions appear to prohibit product patents on 
                                                                                                                         
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECH 
(Robert Hahn ed., 2005). 
 81. The license states in relevant part: “You acknowledge that the Genotype Data-
base and the data contained in it, to which access is provided under the terms of this Li-
cense, are protected by law including, but not limited to, copyright laws of the United 
States . . . ”, HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 5. 
 82. International HapMap Project, Data Access Policy, http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-
perl/registration, ¶ G [hereinafter HapMap Data Policy] (“[While] you are free to publish 
the results of those analyses [of genotypic information], you may not include in such pub-
lications the details of the individual genotypes that the Project has not yet released.”). 
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SNPs or haplotypes83 but may allow for claims to certain uses of SNPs 
and haplotypes.84  
Finally, the enforceability of open source licenses remains a somewhat 
open question. Clickwrap licenses are generally considered enforceable 
contracts, so long as the licensee has had the opportunity to view and as-
sent to the terms.85 However, if a public funding agency were to bring a 
breach of contract action against a license violator, the measure of dam-
ages would be unclear. Perhaps alleged infringers of patents that were ob-
tained or enforced in violation of the agreement could assert that the pat-
ents were invalid or unenforceable for inequitable conduct, but there is no 
clear authority for such an argument. It may be that such agreements are 
better understood as efforts to define norms of forbearance from enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights within a scientific community than as 
binding agreements that are themselves enforceable in a court of law.  
More recent community resource projects have been less aggressive in 
their approach to restricting future intellectual property claims. Like the 
HapMap license, the GAIN Data Use Certification requires those who ac-
cess the data to refrain from disclosing the data to anyone who is not 
bound by the same agreement.86 It also urges registrants not to rely on 
GAIN-supported data to seek patents on markers that might be useful in 
diagnosis or identification of drug targets.87 However, the language is en-
tirely hortatory, calling upon approved users to “acknowledge the intent” 
of the GAIN IP policy, reminding them that “[i]n this spirit, it is expected” 
that data and conclusions will remain freely available, and stating that 
GAIN “encourages” compliance with various NIH policies that favor shar-
                                                                                                                         
 83. HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 2(b)(i). The policy explaining the license is 
more ambiguous on the question of product patents. It suggests that patents, presumably 
both product and process patents, on haplotypes with identified utility are acceptable so 
long as they do not block access to the underlying HapMap Data. See HapMap Data Pol-
icy, supra note 82, ¶ E (“This licensing approach is not intended to block the ability of 
users to file for intellectual property protection on specific haplotypes for which they 
have identified associated phenotypes, such as disease susceptibility, drug responsive-
ness, or other biological utility, as long as public access to, and use of, the data produced 
by the HapMap Project is preserved.”). 
 84. HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 2(b)(ii) (“[Y]ou shall not file any patent ap-
plications that contain claims to particular uses of any SNP, genotype or haplotype data 
obtained from the Genotype Database or any SNP, haplotype or haplotype block based on 
data obtained from, the Genotype Database, unless such claims do not restrict, or are li-
censed on such terms that they do not restrict, the ability of others to use at no cost the 
Genotype Database or the data that it contains for other purposes.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 86. GAIN Terms of Access, supra note 65, ¶ 4. 
 87. Id. ¶ 5. 
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ing.88 Further, the document explicitly “recognizes the importance of the 
later development of IP on downstream discoveries, especially in thera-
peutics.”89  
The less rigid language used in the GAIN Data Use Certification 
makes good sense given the difficulty of determining ex ante just which 
patents will prove necessary to preserve economic incentives for product 
development in the biopharmaceutical area.90 A small diminution in the 
incentives of public sector database contributors to contribute their data is 
a price worth paying for a safeguard against destruction of future incen-
tives for product development.  
In sum, experience with restrictions on access to genomics databases 
suggests that contract-based restrictions on access can provide incentives 
for data producers to contribute their data. Indeed, data producers may 
strongly prefer such restrictions. Contractual restrictions, however, are 
very difficult to enforce without sacrificing dissemination. Contractual 
restrictions on future intellectual property rights may be particularly ill-
advised in an area as sensitive to patents as biomedical science. 
C. What Gets Deposited and When 
A third set of questions concerns what data get deposited and when. 
One benchmark is the standard set in the National Research Council report 
Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials. This report calls for dis-
closure of “whatever is necessary to support the major claims of the paper 
and would enable one skilled in the art to verify or replicate the claims.”91 
Tying disclosure obligations to publication has implications for both the 
scope and timing of disclosure obligations.  
With respect to the scope of disclosure, the focus on verification and 
replication of publication claims allows for evolution in standards of dis-
closure over time within a given scientific community. In the case of the 
Protein Data Bank, for example, requirements for what gets deposited 
have evolved. Initially, crystallographers only deposited atomic coordi-
nates. However, scientists subsequently determined that atomic coordi-
nates did not necessarily provide all the information necessary for verifica-
tion and improvement. Today there is general agreement that structural 
                                                                                                                         
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Alternatively, it may reflect a recognition that simple release of GAIN-
supported data is all that is necessary to invalidate marker patents. 
 91. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 5. 
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factors—the raw information from which researchers derive coordinates—
should also be deposited.92 
The issue of when data should be deposited is a critical one. As al-
ready noted, for community resource projects in genomics, the public 
sponsors have generally required immediate, pre-publication deposit.93 
CIRM should recognize, though, that pre-publication release of data is 
highly unusual in science. The data release policies for community re-
source projects in genomics offer a precedent for centralized data produc-
tion projects that CIRM might fund. However, it is unlikely that scientists 
could be persuaded to agree to pre-publication release beyond that context. 
As discussed earlier, the current structure of investigator-driven academic 
science virtually requires some level of secrecy prior to publication. In this 
context, pre-publication data release might even be undesirable because it 
would interfere with the incentives provided by the reputation benefits at-
tached to publication.  
On the other hand, a significant drawback to the current system of ty-
ing data release to publication is that negative data often remain undis-
closed. CIRM might be able to address this bias in a data release policy by 
requiring disclosure not only of the data that leads to the publication but 
also of any negative data that emerge along the way. Indeed, because 
negative data can prove highly useful for future researchers, CIRM would 
perform a valuable service by establishing data archives that require de-
posits of both positive and negative data. 
If disclosure obligations are not tied to publication, it becomes neces-
sary to establish another marker to signal when data are ripe for release. In 
the case of the HGP, the community originally determined that sequence 
assemblies of 1-2 kilobases or greater should be released. However, when 
the community switched in part to a different sequencing methodology 
that did not assemble completed sequences until much later in the project, 
it determined that tying data release to assembly was no longer appropri-
ate. In 2000, NIH extended its release policy to include submission of raw 
sequence traces.94  
Finally, it bears emphasis that the distinction between pre-publication 
data deposit and data deposit upon publication rests on a model that cur-
rently prevails in the life sciences in which peer review precedes print 
                                                                                                                         
 92. Interview with Helen Berman, supra note 72. 
 93. National Human Genome Research Institute, Reaffirmation and Extension of 
NHGRI Rapid Data Release Policies: Large-Scale Sequencing and Other Community 
Resource Projects—February 2003, http://www.genome.gov/10506537. 
 94. See id.  
1212 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3 
 
publication. This distinction may become less important in the future if the 
life sciences community adopts a model similar to that used in the physics 
community, as well as in other scholarly communities, where Web-based 
publication precedes peer review.  
In the near term, publication is likely to provide a useful benchmark 
for both the timing and scope of data disclosure for most CIRM-funded 
research. This approach is less likely to disrupt traditional scientific re-
wards and incentives than a system of pre-publication disclosure, making 
it easier to persuade scientists to comply. It has the further advantage of 
allowing CIRM to rely on the judgments of journal editors and peer re-
viewers in determining when research results are ripe for disclosure.  
D. Database Architecture, Curation, and Maintenance 
A last set of issues relates to database architecture, curation, and main-
tenance. Such issues tend to be neglected, but they are critical to the long-
term survival and usefulness of databases.  
A centralized, Web-based data archive is the most obvious platform 
for data sharing. In biomedical research, some of the most prominent da-
tabases—GenBank for DNA sequence data and the PDB for 3-D structure 
data—are centralized repositories. A major advantage of a centralized da-
tabase is that data are prominently available in a uniform, readily search-
able format. Disadvantages include cost and the need for agreement on 
data standards. Even with these disadvantages, a centralized database is 
probably most appropriate for data that are most useful when aggregated, 
such as data on gene expression or on the characteristics of available stem 
cell lines.  
Another format that might prove useful for certain projects is a feder-
ated approach, in which data are maintained and controlled at the level of 
the individual lab but can be integrated across databases. Federated sys-
tems might be useful even in situations where the core data reside on a 
central computer or server. For example, the distributed annotation system 
(DAS) that can be used on genomic data deposited at EMBL, the Euro-
pean counterpart to Genbank, allows those who want to annotate genomic 
data to do so on their own servers. Other DAS users can then designate 
which server annotations to layer over the core data.95  
                                                                                                                         
 95. Telephone Interview with Lincoln Stein, Researcher, Cold Spring Harbor Labo-
ratory, in Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y. (May 13, 2005); see also Lincoln D. Stein, Sean 
Eddy & Robin Dowell, Distributed Sequence Annotation System, http://biodas.org/-
documents/rationale.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). 
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The format that is probably least useful, but may nonetheless be suffi-
cient for certain investigator-initiated projects, is posting on a local lab 
server. This format maximizes investigator control over the data but is 
relatively inconvenient for access by other users. 
For all three types of databases—centralized, federated, and local—
funding for ongoing curation and maintenance is critical. Indeed, one of 
the central problems facing life sciences databases today is that funds for 
curation and maintenance are often not available. A recent survey of 
eighty-nine life science databases determined that fifty-one are struggling 
financially: they have either been shut down for lack of funding or are be-
ing updated sporadically.96 As it considers what types of research to fund, 
CIRM should be aware of the importance of providing funding for the on-
going curation and maintenance of databases that serve as important re-
sources for the stem cell community.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Proposition 71 calls upon CIRM to balance a number of competing in-
terests, including not only scientific progress but also commercialization 
of research results and financial returns to the State of California. In the 
context of patenting, licensing, and tangible research materials, CIRM has 
enunciated a detailed plan for balancing these competing interests. With 
respect to the important issue of data sharing, however, the balance that 
CIRM aims to strike is less clear. Data sharing represents a significant op-
portunity for a show of leadership. The federal example binds CIRM less 
directly in the area of data sharing than it does in the area of patents and 
licensing. At the same time, because data sharing has been a prominent 
and recurrent source of tension in the global biomedical research commu-
nity, CIRM has a rich history outside the state of California upon which to 
draw. Prior experience with data sharing in federally-funded research and 
multinational research efforts, such as the HGP and the HapMap Project, 
offers both instructive examples and cautionary tales. Achieving CIRM’s 
multiple goals will require considerable creativity. However, if the CIRM 
data sharing experiment works successfully, aspects of its policy may 
serve as a model for other states or even for the federal government. 
                                                                                                                         
 96. Zeeya Merali & Jim Giles, Databases in Peril, 435 NATURE 1010 (2005).  
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